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Set-Off Under Uninsured Motorist's Coverage
Leon M. Plevin*
E VER INCREASING PERSONAL INJURY and death cases, precipitated by
uninsured motorists, created the necessity for a specific insurance
program to indemnify innocent victims for their losses occasioned by
the careless motorist. The solution to this problem was the establish-
ment of the "uninsured motorist coverage," annexed to the standard
automobile liability policy.' This endorsement was established by the
insurance industry in 1955, with the purpose of closing the gaps in-
herent in motor vehicle financial responsibility and compulsory insur-
ance legislation.2
The limits of liability under uninsured motorist coverage are fixed
either by policy provisions or by statute. The limits are usually the
same as those stipulated under the various financial liability laws of
the State where the policy is issued and delivered. 3 These limits have
been affected because the situation often arises where a claimant, who
has sustained injuries compensable under uninsured motorist coverage,
is entitled to indemnification from several sources. Recovery limits
under uninsured motorist coverage are generally subject to reduction
by any amount paid under bodily injury coverage; by any amount re-
ceived by the uninsured under medical payments coverage for medical
expenses arising out of the accident with the uninsured motor vehicle;
and by any amount paid to the insured under any workmen's com-
pensation laws.
A standard for expressing such policy limits which is commonly
used is as follows:
(a) The limit of liability stated in the declaration as applicable to
"each person" is the limit of the company's liability for all damages,
including damages for care or loss of services, because of bodily
injuries sustained by one person, as a result of any one accident,
and subject to the above provision respecting each person, the limit
of liability stated in the declaration as applicable to "each accident"
is a total limit of the company's liability for all damages, including
damages for care or loss of services, because of bodily injury sus-
tained by two or more persons as the result of any one accident.
* Member of the Bar of Cleveland, Ohio.
1 "Uninsured Motorist Coverage" in an automobile liability policy is designed to
close the gaps inherent in motor vehicle financial responsibility and compulsory
insurance and legislation. An insurance coverage is intended, within fixed limits, to
provide financial recompense to innocent persons who receive injuries, and to de-
pendents of those who are killed through the wrongful conduct of the motorist who,
because uninsured and not financially responsible, cannot be made to respond in
damages. G.S. § 20-279 21(b) (3). Wright v. Fidelity & Casualty Co. of New York,
270 N.C. 577, 155 S.E. 2d 100 (1967).
2 2 Long, Law of Liability Insurance, § 24.03 (1970).
3 Id. at § 24.15.
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(b) if claim is made under this coverage and claim is also made
against any person who is an insured under Coverage A because of
bodily injury sustained in an accident by a person who is insured
under this coverage:
(1) Any payment made under this coverage to or for any such
person shall be applied to reduction of any amount which he
may be entitled to recover from any person who is insured un-
der Coverage A;
(2) Any payment made under Coverage A, to or for any such
person shall be applied in reduction of any amount which he
may be entitled to recover under this coverage.
(c) Any loss payable under the terms of this coverage to or for
any person shall be reduced by the amount paid and the present
value of all amounts payable to him under any workmen's com-
pensation law, exclusive of non-occupational disability benefits.4
These various indemnity provisions were created so as to effectively
limit any payments made by the insurance carrier under the uninsured
motorist endorsement in combination with any other sources of in-
demnification to the maximum limit of the uninsured motorist coverage.5
The intent of the insurance underwriter is to limit its payment under
the uninsured motorist coverage to the minimum amount where the
insured is indemnified or partially indemnified from more than one
source. The scope of this paper will specifically be concerned with the
enforceability of these various limitation provisions, with respect to the
insured's indemnification from medical payments and workmen's com-
pensation sources.
Medical Payments Coverage
Numerous insurance underwriters have included in their respective
policies, providing indemnity coverage for injuries or death caused by
the uninsured motorist, a clause which reduces those amounts payable
under the uninsured motorist endorsement by any amounts which are
provided for or made payable to the insured under the medical pay-
ments provisions covering medical expenses arising out of the accident
involving the uninsured motorist. This standard form provision' acts
as a setoff reducing the amount payable under the medical payment
provisions of the policy. Such setoffs may be provided either by statute7
or by provisions within the policy itself. The courts have taken a
4 Id.
5 Widiss, A Guide to Uninsured Motorist Coverage, 105 (1969).
6 1966 Standard Form Uninsured Motorist Endorsement, Part III: Limits of Liability
(d).
7 For Example, Calif. Ins. Code, § 11580.2 (g), providing:
(g) Any loss payable under the terms of the uninsured motorist endorse-
ment or coverage to or for any person may be reduced: . ..
(2) by the amounts paid or due to be paid under any valid and collect-
ible automobile medical payment insurance available to the insured.
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divergent view when considering the enforceability of the medical pay-
ments limitation. Numerous jurisdictions enforce the limitation on the
rationale that it is a "clear and unambiguous" term of the coverage.8
However, the appellate courts of several states have held that such
medical payments limitation is invalid and unenforceable.
The medical payments limitation has been viewed as somewhat
more favorable than a provision which reduces uninsured motorist
coverage by amounts paid the insured under various applicable work-
men's compensation laws. This particular policy limitation concerning
workmen's compensation benefits will be discussed in a later portion
of the paper. The rationale behind the acceptance of the medical pay-
ments setoff is that generally, medical payments made to an insured are
provided by the same insurer under the same liability policy. Under
such circumstances, the policy provision or statutory enactment setting
off such payments prevented the "windfall" or double recovery to the
insured.' 0
In those jurisdictions holding such provision invalid and unenforce-
able the theory presented is that the particular statute requiring pro-
tection against injuries caused by the uninsured motorist would be
violated. The underwriter, being permitted to reduce its liability pay-
able under the endorsement in any manner whatsoever, would receive
a reduction in its limit of liability below the statutory minimum, re-
quiring a showing of unreimbursed loss rather than the statutory re-
quirement of a showing of legal damage. Such practice has been held
ambiguous and contrary to public policy, hence invalid and unenforce-
able."
Express Statutory Provisions
Express statutory authority for the reduction of coverage payable
by reason of an uninsured motorist endorsement by sums equal to
those made payable under medical payment coverage has been enacted
in the State of California, 12 and has been held valid and enforceable
as a proper setoff in that jurisdiction.' 3
S Supra, n. 5 at 117.
9 Id. at 118.
10 Boehler v. Ins. Co. of North America, 290 F. Supp. 867 (E.D. Ark. 1968); Robey v.
Northwestern Ins. Co., 270 F. Supp. 466 (W.D. Ark. 1967), aff'd 399 F. 2d 330 (8th Cir.
1968); Northwestern Mutual Ins. Co. vs. Rhodes, 238 Cal. App. 2d 64, 470 Cal. Rptr.
467 (1965); Fisher v. State Farm Auto. Ins. Co., 243 Cal. App. 2d 749, 52 Cal. Rptr.
721 (1966); Morgan v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 195 S. 2d 698 (1967), writ re-
fused, 250 La. 638, 197 S. 2d 897; Peterson v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 238 Ore.
106, 393 P. 2d 651 (1964).
11 Tuggle v. Government Employees Ins. Co., 207 S. 2d 674 (Fla. 1968), 24 A.L.R. 3d
1342.
12 Supra, n. 7.
13 It is noteworthy to point out that California, in redrafting its Insurance Code,
§ 11580.2, in 1969, clarified that state's position with regard to the medical payment
(Continued on next page)
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Northwestern Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Rhodes,14 appears to be one
of the first reported cases construing statutory provisions expressly
authorizing medical payment setoffs. In Rhodes, suit was brought for
declaratory judgment by the insurance company issuing the policy.
The insured, Geraldine Rhodes, complained that she had not received
full payment under the uninsured motorist coverage of her policy. The
same policy also contained a medical coverage provision. The uninsured
motorist endorsement provided coverage of $10,000.00, per person, which
the insured would be legally entitled to recover as damages resulting
from an owner or operator of an uninsured automobile. The medical
payment coverage provided medical expenses of up to $2,000.00, for
each person injured. Mrs. Rhodes paid a premium for uninsured motor-
ist coverage and also for medical payments coverage. This matter was
submitted to arbitration wherein the arbitrator made an award to Mrs.
Rhodes in accordance with California Insurance Code, Sec. 11580.2. The
arbitrator did not specify medical expenses as a separate item of dam-
ages, but merely made a lump sum award. In determining the insur-
ance company's position with regard to the payment of medical expenses,
Judge Fretz in finding the setoff valid held that:
Section 11580.2 of the Insurance Code contains provisions which
are obviously aimed at preventing a double recovery, or, as the
trial court used the word, "windfall" under the uninsured motorist
section.' 5
One year later the Second District Court of Appeals for California
reviewed questions similar to those presented in the Rhodes decision,
specifically concerning proceeds from medical payments insurance being
deductible from loss payable under uninsured motorist coverage.16 In
this decision, State Farm issued an automobile liability policy to William
Fisher. The policy contained uninsured motorist coverage prescribed by
the Insurance Code, Section 11580.2. As stipulated in the policy con-
tract, the parties entered into arbitration proceedings. An award was
granted to William Fisher in the amount of $70.00, and to Lennie Fisher
in the amount of $5,756.37. The Fishers petitioned the superior court
to confirm the award. Affidavits filed by State Farm revealed that State
(Continued from preceding page)
limitation. The medical payment setoff is now clearly presented. As the amended
statute reads:
(e) The policy or endorsement added thereto may provide that if the insured
has valid and collectible automobile medical payment insurance available to him,
the damages which he shall be entitled to recover from the owner or operator of
an uninsured motor vehicle shall be reduced for the purposes of uninsured mo-
torist coverage.
14 238 Cal. App. 2d 64, 47 Cal. Rptr. 467 (1965).
15 Id. at 238 Cal. App. 2d 68.
16 Fisher v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 243 Cal. App. 2d 749, Cal. Rptr. 721
(1966).
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Farm had paid $1,000.00, to Lennie Fisher and $70.00, to William Fisher
from the "medical payment coverage" of the policy. These medical
payments were not brought to the attention of the arbitrator during
the arbitration proceedings.
Judge Hufstedler, speaking for the court, refused to deduct the
$1,070.00 in medical payments from the arbitrators award for reason
that the arbitrators were simply not informed as to the payment made.
17
However, as to the important ancillary issue of enforceability of the
medical payment coverage limitation, specified in Insurance Code, Sec-
tion 11580.2, the court reaffirmed the position taken in Rhodes, holding
that:
It is one thing to refuse a double recovery to an insured in a
declaratory relief action in which the insurance company can af-
firmatively show that the insured already has the benefit of a cer-
tain coverage, quite another not to permit the insurance company
to modify an award for the only reason that it failed to produce
evidence at the arbitration on an issue which was properly before
the arbitrators.' s
In Cannizzo v. Guarantee Ins. Co.,'19 the sole question presented to
the Court was whether Sec. 11580.2 (g) of the Insurance Code of Cali-
fornia entitled the Guarantee Insurance Company to a setoff for pay-
ments made to the insured under the medical payment provision of the
policy against an award made under the uninsured motorist endorse-
ment, when no specific language was mentioned in the policy providing
for such a setoif. While upholding the provision that an insured's cov-
erage for bodily injury "may be reduced" 20 by the amount of medical
payments made to the insured, the court quite clearly stated that there
must be specific policy provisions setting forth the fact that deductions
of medical payments will be made from sums payable under uninsured
motorist coverage. As Judge Taylor held:
Thus where the code section states that the insured coverage "may
be reduced" by the amount of medical payment made to the insured,
it simply means that such a reduction is a matter to be determined
between the insurance company and its insured. It follows that
since there is no mention of the medical deduction in the insurance
policy, it cannot be allowed.2 1
17 "Having agreed to submit to arbitration, not only the amount of liability of the
uninsured motorist, but also 'the amount payable hereunder,' State Farm should have
submitted all matters pertaining to the 'amount payable' to the arbitrator. Having
failed to do so, it cannot subvert the purposes of the arbitration procedure by asking
the superior court to do it later." Id. at 243, Cal. App. 2d 752.
18 Id. at 754.
19 245 Cal. App. 2d 70, 53 Cal. Rptr. 657 (1966).
20 Calif. Ins. Code, § 11580.2(g), supra, n. 7.
21 Supra, n. 19 at 245 Cal. App. 2d 73.
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Thus, under Rhodes, Fisher, and Canizzo the statutory authority for
setoffs of medical payments coverage from payments made under un-
insured motorist coverage has been held valid and enforceable in the
State of California.
Policy Setoff Provisions Construed As Valid
A number of courts2 2 have taken the view that the medical pay-
ment limitation is valid and enforceable, generally basing such decision
upon the rationale that this particular provision is a "clear and unam-
biguous" term of the policy coverage.23 The Morgan decision,2 4 con-
cerned an automobile liability policy with uninsured motorist coverage
of $5,000.00, per person and medical payment coverage of up to $500.00,
per person. The policy further provided that the uninsured motorist
coverage shall be reduced by all sums paid under the medical payment
coverages. The Court ruled on the sole question as to whether the in-
sureds were entitled to medical payments of $2,500.00, in addition to
full uninsured motorist coverage. Judge Culpepper was quite candid
in his opinion, stating:
Our answer to this argument is simply that the question here is
the construction of the language of this particular policy. The in-
surer has a right to limit its liability in any way it chooses; and
these limitations will be enforced as long as they are not ambiguous
or contrary to statute or public policy.25
In Boehler v. Ins. Co. of North America,26 suit was brought by the
administratrix of the Estate of Kenneth F. Boehler, as a result of a
dispute which arose between the Administratrix and the automobile in-
surance carrier as to whether or not the full proceeds of the uninsured
motorist endorsement amounting to $20,000.00, would be paid. The
carrier confessed judgment for $19,000.00, claiming that it was not
liable for the additional $1,000.00, because it had paid that amount un-
der the medical payment coverage. The uninsured motorist endorse-
ment specifically provided that the carrier would not be obligated to
pay under uninsured motorist coverage any part of the damages repre-
senting expenses for medical services paid or payable under the medical
payment coverage.
The Court reasoned that a provision in the uninsured motorist
22 Supra, n. 10.
23 Morgan v. State Farm Auto Ins. Co., supra, n. 10.
24 Id.
25 Id. at 195 S. 2d 650. Cf. L'Manian v. American Motors Ins. Co., 4 Conn. Cir. 524,
236 A. 2d 349 (1967), whose facts closely resemble those presented in Morgan. Judge
Jacobs noted that the insured is not entitled to recover both under the medical pay-
ments clauses and the uninsured motorist coverage, but that the insured had the
choice of claiming his medical expenses under the medical clause, or under the un-
insured motorist clause, but not under both.
2G Supra, n. 10.
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endorsement permitting the insurer to take credit for payment made
under medical payment coverage did not offend either an Arkansas
statute nor public policy and as such was valid.27 In so holding, Judge
Henley relied upon two recent Arkansas Supreme Court decisions,
M.F.A. Mut. Ins. Co. vs. Bradshaw,28 and M.F.A. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Wal-
lace,2 9 wherein the Supreme Court of Arkansas passed upon the validity
of certain provisions stated in the standard uninsured motorist en-
dorsement. In Bradshaw, the court held that, in general, an insurer
may contract with its insured upon the conditions expressed in his
policy. Such conditions being limited only by statute or public policy.
The insured, by accepting such a policy is deemed to have approved
and assented to it with all conditions and limitations as are expressed
in the policy; such limitations and conditions necessarily being reason-
able and not contrary to public policy.30
The Wallace Court upheld the validity of a policy provision against
"stacking," of uninsured motorist coverages by an insured covered by
more than one policy.3 1 This decision was contrary to that of the district
court decision in Robey v. Safeco Ins. Co.,32 where the court held that
in Arkansas an insurance company may sell as many policies to an in-
sured as it desires and that the insured is entitled to collect under such
policies, the full amount of injuries within policy limits sustained by him
as a result of the negligence of the uninsured motorist. More impor-
tant, however, is the ancillary issue wherein the court held that the in-
surance company could reduce the amount paid under uninsured mo-
torist coverage by amounts received by the insured under the medical
payment provisions of the policy.
Wallace and Bradshaw, did not discuss the medical payment limita-
tion, but rather, both decisions emphasized that provisions contrary
to public policy are invalid and unenforceable. Robey specifically up-
held the validity of the medical payment limitation, while striking down
the provision against "stacking" of uninsured motorist coverage. Through
the synthesizing of reasoning found in these three decisions supra,
Judge Henley, in predicting "state law," 33 concluded that:
in this court's estimation the provision in question is a reasonable
one and does not offend either the statute or public policy.
34
27 Id. at 870.
28 245 Ark. 83, 431 S.W. 2d 252 (1968).
29 245 Ark. 227, 431 S.W. 2d 742 (1968).
30 Supra, n. 28 at 431 S.W. 2d 254.
31 The Wallace decision was concerned with the "other insurance clause" in the pol-
icy stating that the total limit of the carrier's liability under all policies which apply
to an accident with an uninsured motorist, would not exceed the highest applicable
limit of liability or benefit amount under any one policy.
32 Supra, n. 10.
33 Supra, n. 10 at 870.
34 Id.
Jan. 1971
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Setoff Provisions Held As Invalid
Public policy of several states35 has dictated a somewhat divergent
result from that previously discussed in this paper. The Florida courts,
spearheading a more radical approach in the relatively new field of
uninsured motorist coverage, have emphatically held that provisions
for reducing payments made under uninsured motorist coverage by
amounts payable to the insured under medical pay coverages are void
and not enforceable.
In Tuggle v. Government Employee's Ins. Co.,30 the insured was
involved in an automobile collision with an uninsured vehicle. The
defendant's insurance company had issued an automobile liability pol-
icy which included an uninsured motorist endorsement as well as med-
ical payment provisions. However, the policy specifically provided
that any payments made under the uninsured motorist endorsement
would be reduced by those amounts paid or payable under the medical
payment endorsement. Tuggle brought a declaratory judgment action
to determine whether such a setoff provision was in conflict with Florida
statutory authority. 37 The Supreme Court of Florida ruled that the
35 Florida and Nebraska.
36 Supra, n. 11.
37 Fla. Stat., §627.0851 (1967):
(1) No automobile liability insurance, covering liability arising out of the
ownership, maintenance, or use of any motor vehicle, shall be delivered or issued
for delivery in this state with respect to any motor vehicle registered or prin-
cipally garaged in this state unless coverage is provided therein or supplemental
thereto, in not less than limits described in section 324.021(7) under provisions
filed with and approved by the insurance commissioner, for the protection of
persons insured thereunder who are legally entitled to recover damages from
owners or operators of uninsured motor vehicles because of bodily injury, sick-
ness, or disease, including death, resulting therefrom; provided, however, that the
coverage required under this section shall not be applicable where any insured
name in the policy shall reject the coverage; provided further that, unless the
named insured requests such coverage in writing, the coverage need not be pro-
vided in or supplemental to a renewal policy where the named insured had re-
jected the coverage in connection with a policy previously issued to him by the
same insurer.
(2) For the purposes of this coverage the term "uninsured motor vehicle"
shall, subject to the terms and conditions of such coverage, be deemed to include
an insured motor vehicle where the liability insurer thereof is unable to make
payment with respect to the legal liability of its insured within the limits speci-
fied therein because of insolvency.
(3) An insurer's insolvency protection shall be applicable only to accidents
occurring during a policy period in which its insurer's uninsured motorist cover-
age is in effect where the liability insurer of the tort-feasor becomes insolvent
within one year after such an accident. Nothing herein contained shall be con-
strued to prevent any insurer from affording insolvency protection under terms
and conditions more favorable to its insureds than is provided hereunder.
(4) In the event of payment to any person under the coverage required by
this section and subject to the terms and conditions of such coverage, the in-
surer making such payment shall, to the extent thereof, be entitled to the pro-
ceeds of any settlement or judgment resulting from the exercise of any rights of
recovery of such person against any person or organization legally responsible
for the bodily injury for which such payment is made, including the proceeds
recoverable from the assets of the insolvent insurer.
8https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol20/iss1/55
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setoff provision amounted to a reduction of the insurer's limit of liabil-
ity, below the statutory minimum, and further contravened the statute
by requiring a showing of unreimbursed loss rather than legal damages.
Tuggle represents the leading decision in an extremely narrow
field holding such setoffs as invalid,38 which evolved as a result of Flor-
ida's "increasingly restrictive attitude toward insurers attempts to limit
their liability under uninsured motorist endorsements." 39 Prior to
Tuggle, a somewhat similar question was considered by an appellate
court in Phoenix Ins. Co. v. Kincaid.40 The court held that the medical
payment setoff was void, basing such ruling on the rationale that a
setoff would reduce the minimum coverage of uninsured motorist pro-
tection prescribed by the Florida Legislature.4 1
Under the provisions of Florida Statute, Section 627.0851, supra,
the legislature required that in every automobile liability insurance
policy or supplement thereto, there is to be included uninsured motorist
coverage, unless the named insured specifically rejects such coverage.
The statutory minimum required by Florida42 is $10,000.00, for bodily
injury to one person, and $20,000.00 for bodily injury or death of two
or more persons. The Tuggle court's theory was that the uninsured
motorist statute43 was enacted to assure that each automobile liability
insurance policy provided uninsured motorist coverage which would be
enforceable to the full statutory minimum to exactly the same extent
that the policy holder would be entitled to recover damages from a
third party tort-feasor.
4 1
Tuggle represented an even further advance in restricting an in-
surer's attempt to limit liability under uninsured motorist coverage
than was presented in the earlier Florida Supreme decision of United
States Fidelity & Guarantee Co. v. Sellers,45 holding that an insurer
may not deny coverage on the ground that the insured has other insur-
ance available to him.46 Tuggle extended the setoff limitation from
38 Supra, n. 35.
39 Uninsured Motorist Coverage-Setoff of Amounts Payable Under Medical Pay-
ments Coverage, 23 Miami L. Rev. 249 (1968).
40 199 S. 2d 770 (Fla. 1967).
41 Supra, n. 37.
42 Fla. Stat. § 324.021 (1967).
43 Supra, n. 37.
44 Supra, n. 11 at 674.
45 187 S. 2d 689 (Fla. 1966).
46 Sellers raised the question of the insurer's attempt to limit liability through
"other insurance" or "pro-rata clauses." The effect such clauses have had on un-
insured motorist endorsement setoffs has caused tremendous impact on insurance
law, and while this particular area is outside the scope of this paper, a brief inter-
pretation of the "other insurance" clauses should be provided so that the ramifica-
tions arising out of Sellers and Tuggle may be better understood. It is possible that
an insured may have duplicating coverage if he is involved in an accident with an
(Continued on next page)
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"other similar insurance" carried by the insured to the medical payment
provision. As Judge Drew concluded:
In view of the fact that two classes of coverage involved in the
policy under consideration were contracted separately, with inde-
pendent premiums, we are unable to distinguish this situation from
that in Sellers, relating to multiple carriers. Nor does there appear
to be any basis for treating the setoff provision as amounting only
to a contractual reduction of medical benefits, contrary to the actual
language of the policy stating in the provision for uninsured mo-
torist coverage that the company shall not be obligated to pay any
part of such liability which represents expense "payable" by the
insurer under its medical benefits coverage. The clause on its face
is one to decrease uninsured motorist coverage beneath the statu-
tory minimum, and one which means that under certain conditions
(medical benefits in excess of $10,000.00) there will be no uninsured
motorist coverage whatever.4 7
As a result of Tuggle and Sellers, supra, in addition to several
Florida lower court decisions,48 the uninsured motorist carrier stands
in the shoes of the tort-feasor and as such, the carrier may not mitigate
any payments to be received by the insured, notwithstanding the fact
that it is a contractual relationship existing between the injured insured
and the carrier expressly providing for such setoff. The collateral source
rule has been effectively applied to exactly such situation with the
resultant fact that the insurance carrier now standing in place of the
tort-feasor may not diminish its damages under uninsured motorist cov-
erage by demonstrating medical payments to the insured. The result
will be the formulation of a policy "that puts a dollar in the pocket of
the injured party for every dollar of compensation for medical ex-
pense." 49 In effect, what will evolve is double recover to the insured
under the uninsured motorist coverage and medical payment provision.
(Continued from preceding page)
uninsured motorist. Sellers held quite conclusively that where such a situation ex-
isted the insurer may not deny coverage on the ground that the insured has such
similar insurance available to him. However, the Court went further stating that the
Statutory requirement of uninsured motorist protection does not permit an insured
to pyramid such coverages under separate automobile liability policies, which if
allowed, would result in the insured recovery more than his actual damages. Under
such circumstances, the insured could proceed against any one or more multiple
insured, but in no event would he be entitled to recover from all of them more than
his loss and bodily injury.
47 Supra, n. 11 at 675.
48 Sims v. Natl. Cas. Co., 171 S. 2d 399 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1965), the first Florida decision
restricting insurer's attempt to limit liability under uninsured motorist coverage,
holding that uninsured motorist coverage and medical payments coverage were sepa-
rate and independently contracted for, there being no implication of the existence
of a right to setoff medical payments made;
Standard Acc. Ins. Co. v. Gavin, 184 So. 2d 229 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1966), the First
District Court of Appeals considered the question of a setoff provision of workmen's
compensation benefits, the court refusing such setoffs.
49 Supra, n. 39 at 254.
10https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol20/iss1/55
20 CLEV. ST. L. R. (1)
Simultaneously to Florida's handing down Tuggle, the Supreme
Court of Nebraska decided Stephens v. Allied Mutual Insurance Co.,5 0
closely paralleling the setoff question raised in Tuggle. Stephens sued
his insurance company under the uninsured motorist provision of his
automobile liability policy because the tort-feasor's carrier was unable
to defend the original action due to its insolvent condition occurring
subsequent to the accident, making the uninsured motorist coverage
of the insured applicable. Stephens' insurance carrier contended that
it was entitled to a setoff in the amount of $1,000, for medical payments
paid under the medical payments coverage provision of the policy with
the applicable setoff provisions.
The Court held that a setoff of medical payments coverage against
the proceeds the insured is entitled to receive under uninsured motorist
coverage is void and against public policy. The Court's reasoning was
directly analogous to the Tuggle rationale. The Court found that the
medical payment and the uninsured motorist coverages were separate
and independent contractual provisions for which separate premiums
were charged; and to permit a limitation of the uninsured motorist
protection required to be offered by statute,5 1 by a policy setoff pro-
vision would be void as being contrary to the statute and public policy.
5 2
Ohio Position On Setoffs
Quite simply stated, there is an absence of case law evolving around
the setoff principle concerning uninsured motorist coverage. The most
concise statement that might be made about Ohio's position concerning
medical payment setoffs is that the arbitrators in general, hearing the
numerous uninsured motorist cases have merely permitted the in-
surance carrier to setoff such medical payments made under the medical
payment provision of the insurance policy. Acting as both plaintiff's
attorney and arbitrator on uninsured motorist cases for several years
it has been my observation that the medical payments setoff has been
widely accepted by both plaintiff and defense counsel and as a result
no litigation has been promulgated concerning the medical payment set-
offs.
One statutory development has recently taken place which may very
well bring the setoff controversy into the Ohio courtroom. The statutory
50 82 Neb. 562, 156 N.W. 2d 133 (1968).
51 Neb. Stat., R.S. Supp. 1965, § 60-509.01.
52 The general rule is that an insurer may not limit its liability under uninsured
motorist coverage by setoffs or limitations through "other insurance," excess insur-
ance or medical payment reduction clauses, and this is true even when the setoff for
the reduction is claimed with respect to a separate, independent policy of insurance
(workmen's compensation) or other insured motorist coverage. And this is true be-
cause the insured is entitled to recover the same amount he would have recovered
if the offending motorist had maintained liability insurance. 156 N.W. 2d at 139.
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requirement of mandatory offering of uninsured motorist coverage 53 was
amended to explicitly prohibit the reduction of payments made under
uninsured motorist coverage by proceeds received by the insured of
any workmen's compensation benefits paid or payable as a result of the
same injury or death.54 This may very well be the first step in the
direction of setoff litigation eventually resolving the setoff problem. As
of October 1, 1970, no setoff may be had against the insured by reason
of workmen's compensation benefits, this prohibition would seem to leave
the door open for future questions regarding setoffs for medical pay-
ments, "other insurance" and "pro-rata clauses."
Conclusion
To reduce amounts payable under the uninsured motorist endorse-
ment, the standard form of such endorsement includes a specific limita-
tion of liability with respect to expenses paid under the medical pay-
ments coverage of the insurance policy, such limitation, where enforce-
able, being quite effective. As a result of this limitation, two divergent
views have arisen. The majority viewpoint holds that such limitation is
a "clear and unambiguous" 55 term of the coverage, and as such valid
and enforceable. The second viewpoint maintains that such a term is
void as being against public policy.56
California provided the exception to the rather cut and dried ac-
ceptance or non-acceptance of setoff provision by enacting an express
statutory provision5 7 authorizing the reduction of coverage payable
under medical payments provision of the policy. The California statutory
enactment added substantial force to those jurisdictions holding that
such setoff provisions are perfectly valid standards of the automobile
liability policy.
The controversy has arisen but is somewhat one sided in those juris-
dictions which have considered the question of enforceability of the
medical payment setoff. The majority have stated that this particular
reduction is a clear and unambiguous provision of the policy and en-
forceable on the theory that the insured should not be permitted a
double recovery or windfall based upon two separate provisions of a
single policy; in addition to the fact that the policy in and of itself is a
contractual matter between the insured and the carrier, and such setoff
is not against public policy.
53 Ohio Rev. Code, § 3937.18 (1970).
54 Id. at 3937.18(D). The coverage required by this section shall not be made sub-
ject to any exclusion or reduction in amount because any workmen's compensation
benefits payable as a result of the same injury or death.
55 Supra, n. 10.
56 Supra, n. 11; n. 50.
57 Supra, n. 7.
12https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol20/iss1/55
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Florida, at the other end of the spectrum, has taken a somewhat
more radical position in restricting the insurance carrier from reducing
payments made under uninsured motorist coverage, holding such re-
duction by medical payments as void and against public policy. The
rationale was based on the statutory authority requiring financial re-
sponsibility by all motorists. The Florida courts demanded assurance
that the uninsured motorist coverage would be enforceable to the full
statutory minimum, to exactly the same extent that a policy holder
would be entitled to recover damages from a third party tort-feasor,
thereby placing the insurance carrier in the shoes of the tort-feasor
under the uninsured motorist endorsement.
In all probability this controversy cannot be resolved by a single
answer. The majority of those jurisdictions litigating questions regard-
ing the setoff provisions have remained firm, holding such setoffs as
valid. In only two jurisdictions, Florida and Nebraska, have the setoffs
been ruled void. There has been no carryover of the minority view-
point to other jurisdictions and it would seem that the prevailing opinion
is that the uninsured motorist endorsement and medical payments
coverage being strictly contractual, would be considered binding and
given full effect. The insurance companies have once again gained sig-
nificant ground in limiting their liability under existing policies even in
view of the fact that the medical payments coverage and uninsured
motorist coverage were separately contracted and paid for separately.
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